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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of a pollution tax as a pollution control device on the output and location decisions of 
undifferentiated oligopolistic firms with free entry. It shows that the optimum output and location of an oligopolistic 
firm is independent of a change in the pollution tax if the demand function is linear. Furthermore, an increase in the 
pollution tax will increase (decrease) output and move the plant location toward (away from) the CBD if the demand 
function is concave (convex). It also shows that a higher pollution tax will increase the pollution damage if the demand 
function is linear and the location effect dominates the demand effect. These results are significantly different from the 
conventional results based on the monopolistic location model. It indicates that the demand condition plays an 
important role in the determination of the impact of a pollution tax on the location decision of an oligopolistic firm and 
the pollution damage to the CBD residents. 
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1. Introduction 
In his famous 1973 paper, Tintenberg (1973) showed that in a general equilibrium model 
firms will face different pollution taxes because the marginal contribution of waste to
pollution varies spatially. Along this line, Mathur (1976), Gokturk (1979) and Forster 
(1988) introduced pollution taxes into the linear location model and examined the effects 
of a change in the pollution tax on the plant location and on abatement decisions of the 
firm.  Recently, Hwang and Mai (2004) (henceforth HM) extended the conventional 
linear location model to the two-dimensional Weber triangular location model. 
Assuming that (1) a monopolist uses two transportable inputs located at two vertices to 
produce a product which is sold at CBD (i.e., Central Business District) located at the 
third vertex, (2) the objective of the firm is to find the profit maximizing plant location 
within the triangle, they obtained the following important propositions. 
HM1. The plant location of the firm is invariant with respect to a change in the pollution 
tax policy if the production function is constant returns to scale. Nevertheless, the 
plant location moves closer to (farther away from) the CBD as a result of higher 
pollution tax if the production function is decreasing returns to scale (increasing
returns to scale). Hwang and Mai (2004, p. 61).
HM2. If the production function is increasing returns to scale, then a higher pollution 
tax will decrease the pollution damage to the CDB residents. Hwang and Mai (2004, 
p. 62).
However, HM1 and HM2 emphasize the cost factors and neglect the demand factors of 
plant location. They only focus on the polar case of monopoly.  Given that oligopolistic 
industries are relatively common in the economy, it is surprising that the impact of 
pollution taxes on the location decisions of oligopolistic firms has received little 
attention. 
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap.  It explicitly incorporates oligopolistic 
market structure into the Weber triangle and examines the impact of a change in the 
pollution tax on the plant location and on abatement decisions of oligopolistic firms.  It 
will be shown that HM1 and HM2 need not hold in the oligopolistic location model. 
2. An Oligopolistic Location Model 
Our analysis is based on the following assumptions. 
(a) N firms employ two transportable inputs (M1 and M2) located at A and B to produce a 
homogenous product (q) which is sold at the output market C locating at the CBD.  The
location triangle in Figure 1 illustrates the location problem of oligopolistic firms.  In 
figure 1, the distance a and b and the angle γ are known; h is the distance between the 
plant location (E) and the CBD (C); z1 and z2 are the distances of plant location (E) from
A and B, respectively; θ is the angle between CA and CE. 
(b) Firms make Cournot-Nash conjectures about their rivals’ production and location 
decisions and enter the industry without any restrictions until there is no economic profit. 
Assume also that equilibra are symmetric.  Thus, we can neglect the location dispersion 
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of firms and focus on the impact of market demand on the location decision of a
representative firm. 
C 
γ
 I θ  J 
h 
a E b 
z1  z2
 A B 
Figure 1. The Weber-Moses Triangle 
(c) The production function is homothetic and can be specified as: 
q = f(M1, M2) (1) 
2 <with fM1 ≡ ∂q/∂M1 > 0, fM2 ≡ ∂q/∂M2 > 0, fM1M1 ≡ ∂2q/∂M1 2 < 0, fM2M2 ≡ ∂2q/∂M2 
0. 
(d) The industry inverse demand function for output is given by 
P = P(Q) (2) 
where Q = ∑qi is the market quantity demanded,  PQ ≡ ∂P/∂Q < 0, cf. HM (2004, p. 59). 
N 
It should be noted that ∑ denotes ∑ . 
i=1 
(e) The prices of inputs and output are evaluated at the plant location (E).  The cost of 
purchasing inputs is the price of input at the sour ce plus the freight cost, and the price of 
output is the market price minus the fr eight cost. 
(f) Transportation rates are constant. 
(g) The pollution tax revenue function can be specified as: 
G(q, e) = ey(q) (3) 
where e = the pollution tax rate, y(q) = the amount of pollution generated by the 
production process that depends on the output level.  Following HM (2004, p. 60), we 
2
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
   
 
 
     
 
      
      
      
 
 
               
                                     
                                                                     
                                                                           
                                                            
                                                                                               
                                                                                      
assume that y(q) = βq, β is a positive constant, thus Gq = eβ >0, Gqq = 0, Gqe = β > 0, and 
Ge = βq > 0. 
(h) The objective of each firm is to find the optimum location and production within the 
Weber triangle which maximizes the profit. 
With these assumptions, the profit maximizing location problem of the representative 
firm is given by 
        max Π = [P(Q)-th]f(M1, M2) – (w1+r1z1)M1 – (w2+r2z2)M2 – G(q, e) (4) 
where z1 = (a2 + h2 – 2ahcosθ)1/2, z2 = [b2 + h2 – 2bhcos(γ-θ)]1/2; w1 and w2 are the base 
prices of M1 and M2 at their sources A and B; t, r1 and r2 are constant transportation rates 
of q, M1, M2; z1, z2, and h are the distances from the plant location to the source location
A, B and the market location C.  It is worth mentioning that q, M1, M2, h and θ are 
choice variables and a, b, e, γ, w1, w2, t, r1, r2 are positive parameters. 
     Assuming that the oligopolistic firm treats q instead of M1 and M2 as a decision 
variable, we first derive the cost function by minimizing total cost subject to a given 
output at a given location, 
       min L = (w1+r1z1)M1 – (w2+r2z2)M2  + λ[q – f(M1, M2)] (5) 
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier; q, h and θ are parameters.  Using the standard
comparative static analysis and the envelope theorem, we can show that the production 
function is homothetic if and only if the cost function is separable in the sense that 
C(q; h, θ) = c(w1+r1z1, w2+r2z2)H(q) (6)
where c is a function of the delivered prices of M1 and M2, cf. Takayama (1993, 
Proposition 3.5., pp. 147-148). Hence, the average cost and marginal cost can be written 
as: 
      AC = C(q; h, θ)/q = c(h, θ)H(q)/q (7) 

MC = Cq = c(h, θ)Hq  (8) 

where Cq ≡ ∂C(q; h, θ)/∂q and Hq ≡  dH(q)/dq. 
     Following Hanoch (1975), from (7) and (8), we obtain the following relation: 
H(q)/q > (=) < Hq  (9) 
if the production function exhibits increasing (constant) or decreasing returns to scale. 
Substituting the cost function C = C(q; h, θ) into (4), we obtain the profit as a function 
of q, θ and h. The first-order condition for a maximum would be 
∂Π/∂q = [(P + PQq) – th] – c(.)Hq – Gq = 0 (10) 
∂Π/∂θ = - cθH(q) = 0 (11) 
∂Π/∂h = - tq – chH(q) = 0 (12) 
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where Gq ≡ ∂G(.)/∂q, cθ ≡ ∂c(.)/∂θ, ch ≡ ∂c(.)/∂h. Assume that the second-order 
conditions are satisfied and the possibility of the corner solution is excluded; cf. 
Kusumoto (1986) and Mai and Hwang (1992).  We can solve (10)-(12) for q, θ and h 
when entry is prohibited. 
If free entry is allowed, each firm in the industry earns normal profit only.  The 
following condition must be satisfied. 
Π = [P(Nq) – th]q – c(.)H(q) – G(q, e) = 0 (13) 
If there is an interior solution, we can solve equations (10) – (13) for q, θ, h and N in 
terms of e and v = (a, b, γ, w1, w2, r1, r2, t), where v is a vector of remaining parameters.
q = q(e, v), θ = θ(e, v), h = h(e, v), N = N(e, v) (14) 
The expressions for the partial derivatives such as ∂q/∂e, ∂θ/∂e, ∂h/∂e and ∂N/∂e can be
obtained by applying the standard comparative static analyses.  It is of interest to note 
before concluding this section that there must be increasing returns to scale for a solution 
as in (14). To see this, we divide both sides of equation (13) by q and utilizing (10) to 
obtain 
        [P(Nq) – th] = c(.)H(q)/q – G(q, e)/q                      (15) 
Substituting (15) into (10), we obtain
 PQq = c(.)[Hq(q) - H(q)/q] + [Gq - G(q, e)/q] (16) 
Clearly, the left-hand side of (16) will be negative.  Since Gq = G(q, e)/q and c(.) > 0, for
the right-hand side of (16) to be negative, the production function must exhibit increasing 
returns to scale, i.e., H(q)/q > Hq(q).  It simply implies that in equilibrium all firms 
produce on the downward sloping part of the average cost curve but not on  minimum 
average cost under Cournot competition with free entry.    
     This completes our modeling of the basic framework for studying the effects of a
pollution tax on the oligopolistic firm’s production and location decisions. 
3. Effects of Pollution Tax on Production and Location Decisions 
We are now in a position to examine the effect of a change in the pollution tax rate on the 
optimum output and location.  Totally differentiating equations (10)-(13) and applying 
Cramer’s rule, we obtain the following results. 
(∂q/∂e) = (-D2/D4)yPQQq2  (17) 
(∂θ/∂e) = (-1/D4)yPQQq2Πθhch{[H(q)/q] – Hq} (18)
 (∂h/∂e) = (1/D4)yPQQq2Πθθch{[H(q)/q] – Hq} (19)
 (∂N/∂e) = (y/D4)(D2{[2PQ + PQQq – c(.)Hqq] + (N - 1)PQQq} – ΠθθΠqh 2) (20) 
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where Πθh = - chθH(q), Πθθ = - cθθH(q), Πqq = (N + 1)PQ + NPQQq – cHqq, Πq = PQq(N – 
1), Πqh = ch{[H(q)/q] – Hqq}, D2 = ΠθθΠhh - Πθh 2 and D4 is the relevant Hessian 
determinant.  It should be noted that Πθθ < 0, D2 > 0 and D4 > 0 by the stability 
conditions and ch < 0 can be seen from (12). 
Assume that the market demand function is linear, i.e., PQQ = 0. From (17) – (19), we
obtain (∂q/∂e) = 0, (∂θ/∂e) = 0 and (∂h/∂e) = 0. Thus, we can conclude that 
Proposition 1. The optimum output and location of an oligopolistic firm is independent 
of a change in the pollution tax rate if the demand function is linear.
     The effect of pollution tax on the optimum output and location is, perhaps, surprising. 
According to HM (2004), in the monopoly case, an increase in the pollution tax rate will 
decrease the monopolist’s output level and alter its location decision if the demand 
function is linear. But the above result shows that HM’s monopolistic result can not 
apply to the oligopoly case. The economic interpretation behind Proposition 1 is given as 
follows. A pollution tax does not change the slope of the demand curve at any output 
level but will increase the output price in equilibrium for firms to break even.  In the case 
where the demand function is linear, i.e., PQQ = 0, a higher output price will not alter the 
slope of demand curve and so the required tangency between demand curve and average 
cost curve occurs at the same output level for each firm, i.e., (∂q/∂e) = 0. Since output
per firm remains unchanged, the optimum location will remain the same. 
     Next, we consider the case where the demand function is not linear, i.e., PQQ ≠ 0. 
Since the signs of PQQ and Πθh can not a priori be determined, the signs of (∂q/∂e), 
(∂θ/∂e) and (∂h/∂e) in (17) - (19) are ambiguous.  However, from (17) and (19), we can 
obtain 
(∂q/∂e) < ( >) 0, as PQQ > (<) 0 (21) 
(∂h/∂e) > (<) 0, as PQQ > (<) 0 (22) 
Thus, we can conclude that 
Proposition 2. The optimum output of an oligopolistic firm will increase (decrease) as 
the pollution tax rate increases if the demand function is concave (convex).  The optimum 
location of an oligopolistic firm moves closer to (farther away from) the CBD as the 
pollution tax rate increases if the demand function is concave (convex).
This result is different from that of HM (2004) in the monopoly case.  They show that a 
monopoly will decrease output and move the plant location farther away from the CBD 
as a result of a higher pollution tax if the production function exhibits increasing returns 
to scale. In the oligopolistic case with increasing returns to scale, we show that a higher 
pollution tax will lead to a higher output level and move the plant location closer to the 
CBD if the demand curve is concave.  The economic intuition underlying Proposition 2 is
given as follow. An increase in the pollution tax rate does not change the slope of the 
demand curve at any output level but will increase the output price in equilibrium for 
firms to break even.  In the case where the demand function is concave (i.e., PQQ < 0), a 
higher output price decreases the absolute value of the slope of the demand curve and so 
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the point of tangency between demand curve and average curve occurs at a larger output 
level for each firm.  Since the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale, the 
quantity of inputs, M1 and M2, per unit of output declines, then the resources pull 
decreases while the market pull increases.  As a result, the optimum location moves
towards the CBD.  In the case where the demand function convex (i.e., PQQ > 0), the 
opposite applies. 
4.  Effect of Pollution Tax on Pollution Level 
Next, we examine the impact of pollution taxes on the pollution level at the CBD.  The 
pollution is emitted by undifferentiated oligopolistic firms located at E.  The pollution
level measured at the CBD is lower than at the plant location and is affected by the
distance between the plant lo cation and the CBD.  Following HM (2004), the pollution 
level at CBD is specified as: 
         X* = m(h)X,  mh < 0, mhh > 0 (23) 
where X = total pollution measured at E, X* = total pollution measured at C, m(h) = the 
relationship between the pollution level at CBD and the plant location.  Assume that X = 
y(q). (23) can be rewritten as: 
        X* = m(h)Ny(q)  (24) 
Since the optimal solution of h, q and N is h = h(e, v), q = q(e, v) and N = N(e, v), we
take partial derivative of X* with respect of e to obtain 
∂X*/∂e = mNyq(∂q/∂e) + Nymh(∂h/∂e) + my(∂N/∂e) (25) 
                   = output effect + location effect + entry effect 
Since yq > 0 and mh < 0 and the signs of (∂q/∂e), (∂h/∂e) and (∂N/∂e) rely on the
characteristics of the demand function and the firm’s location decision, thus the sig n of 
(∂X*/∂e) is ambiguous.  However, use the result in (21) and (22), we can show that 
∂X*/∂e > 0, as PQQ = 0 and - D2[2PQ – c(.)Hqq] < – ΠθθΠqh2 (26) 
Thus, we can conclude that 
Proposition 3. If the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale and the 
demand function is linear, a change in the pollution tax rate will increase the p ollution 
damage to the CBD residents if the location effect dominates the demand effect.  
     This result is quite different from HM’s result in the monopoly case.  In the 
monopolistic location model where the production function exhibits increasing returns to 
scale, HM shows that a higher pollution tax rate will decrease the pollution damage.  In 
the oligopolistic location model with free entry, we show that a higher pollution tax r ate 
will increase the pollution damage if the location effect dominates the demand effect.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
We have presented a simple oligopolistic location model and examined the impact of a
pollution tax as a pollution control device on the production and plant location decisions 
of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms.  Under the assumptions that (1) N oligopolistic 
firms are identical and symmetric; (2) they make Cournot-Nash conjectures about their 
rivals’ production and location decisions; (3) they are price takers in the input market and 
the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale; (4) they produce a 
homogenous product, we show the impact of a pollution tax on the production and 
location decision of the oligopolistic firm and the pollution damage to the CBD residents 
crucially depends upon the characteristics of demand function.  These results are different 
from HM’s results based on the monopolistic location model.  HM (2004) shows that the 
impact of a pollution tax on  the production and location decisions of a monopolistic firm
and the pollution damage to the CBD residents crucially depend  upon the characteristics 
of production function only and the demand function plays no role. 
     In the case where the demand function is linear, we show that a change in the 
pollution tax will not change the production and location decisions of the oligopolistic 
firm, and may increase the pollution damage to the CBD residents.  In the case where the 
demand function is concave (convex), we show that an increase in the pollution tax will 
cause each firm’s output to rise (fall) and move the plant location closer to (farther away 
from) the CBD.  We further show that an increase in the pollution tax rate may increase 
the pollution damage to the CBD residents even if the production function exhibit s 
increasing returns to scale. These results are significantly different from HM’s results.   
     Although our analysis is based on a simplified oligopolistic location model, it has shed 
some light on the output and location effects of a pollution tax in an oligopolistic location 
setting. It shows that the market demand condition plays a key role on the effects of a 
pollution tax on output, location decision and pollution damage.  Our results are 
significantly different from the conventional results based on the monopoly setting.  This 
indicates that all regulatory policies which aim at reducing the pollution damage through 
the pollution tax as a pollution control design should receive carefully scrutiny, and there 
is a need for future research in this area. 
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